The primary objective of this paper is to revisit a widely held view that decision theory provides a unifying framework for comparing the frequentist and Bayesian approaches by bringing into focus their common features and neutralizing their differences using a common terminology like decision rules, action spaces, loss and risk functions, admissibility, etc. The paper calls into question this viewpoint and argues that the decision theoretic perspective misrepresents the frequentist viewpoint primarily because the notions of expected loss and admissibility are inappropriate for frequentist inference; they do not represent legitimate error probabilities that calibrate the reliability of inference procedures. In a nutshell, the decision theoreric framing is applicable to what R. A. Fisher called "acceptance sampling", where the decisions revolve around a loss function originating in information 'other than the data'. Frequentist inference is germane to scientific inference where the objective is to learn from data about the 'true' data generating mechanism.
Introduction
A widely held view in statistics is that Wald's (1950) decision-theoretic framework provides a broad enough perspective that can accommodate both the frequentist and Bayesian approaches to inference, despite their well-known differences. Indeed, it is often regarded as a unifying framework for comparing these approaches by bringing into focus their common features and neutralizing their differences using a common terminology based on decision rules, action spaces, loss and risk functions, admissibility, etc.; see Berger (1985) , Robert (2007) .
Historically, Wald (1939) proposed the original decision-theoretic framework as a way to unify frequentist estimation and testing:
"The problem in this formulation is very general. It contains the problems of testing hypotheses and of statistical estimation treated in the literature." citing Neyman (1937) in a footnote (p. 299)
Among the frequentist pioneers, Jerzy Neyman accepted enthusiastically this broader perspective in the early 1950s, primarily because it seemed to provide a formalization for his behavioristic interpretation of Neyman-Pearson (N-P) testing based on the accept/reject rules; see Neyman (1952) . Neyman's attitude towards Wald's (1950) framing was also adopted wholeheartedly by some of his most influential students and colleagues at Berkeley, including Lehmann (1959) and LeCam (1986) . In the forward to the collection of Neyman's early papers published in 1966, Neyman's students involved in selecting his papers to be reprinted write:
"The concepts of confidence intervals and of the Neyman-Pearson theory have proved immensely fruitful. A natural but far reaching extension of their scope can be found in Abraham Wald's theory of statistical decision functions." (Neyman, 1966, p. vii) 
[emphasis added]
In contrast, R. A. Fisher (1955) rejected the decision-theoretic perspective, claiming that it seriously distorts his rendering of frequentist statistics:
"The attempt to reinterpret the common tests of significance used in scientific research as though they constituted some kind of acceptance procedure and led to 'decisions' in Wald's sense, originated in several misapprehensions and has led, apparently, to several more." (p.69)
The primary aim of this paper is to take a closer look at the decision-theoretic framing in order to evaluate the extent to which it provides an appropriate framework for comparing the frequentist and Bayesian approaches. It is argued that the decision-theoretic terminology only glosses over the fundamental differences in the underlying reasoning of the two approaches and gives rise to several misleading interpretations and conclusions. In a nutshell, frequentist inference is germane to scientific inference and the decision theoretic framing is germane to what Fisher (1955) called "acceptance sampling", where the loss function emanates from information 'other than the data'.
The paper argues that the decision theoretic perspective misrepresents the frequentist viewpoint for two interrelated reasons: (a) the decision theoretic framing is at odds with both the primary objective and the reasoning underlying frequentist inference, and (b) the notions of a risk function and admissibility are inappropriate for frequentist inference because they do not represent legitimate error probabilities. The primary objective of frequentist inference is to learn from data x 0 about the 'true' generating mechanism, described in terms of a particular (true) value θ * of θ, as it relates to the underlying statistical model M θ (x), θ∈Θ; θ denotes the unknown parameter(s) and Θ the parameter space. The reasoning underlying frequentist inference takes two different forms, factual (under the true state of nature) and hypothetical (what if θ * is equal to θ 0 ). In contrast, the notions of a loss function and admissibility do not depend on θ * , but are concerned with all possible values of θ∈Θ. Conflating the two has led to numerous misinterpretations in the statistical literature, including mixing the expected loss and MSE with legitimate error probabilities, ignoring the fact that the latter are always attached to the inference procedures themselves, but the former to all values of θ∈Θ. This confusion also undermines a widely held standpoint that the way to generate good statistical procedures is to find the Bayes solution to an inference problem using a 'reasonable' prior and then examine its frequentist properties to see whether it is satisfactory from the latter viewpoint; see Rubin (1984) , Gelman et al (2004) .
Decision-theoretic set up
It is generally accepted that the decision-theoretic framework has four basic elements: "1. The space A of actions available to the statistician.
2. The space Θ of states of the world, or states of nature. One of these is the "true" state, but the statistician does not know which one. The space Θ is also called the parameter space.
In a decision-theoretic framework the loss function L(θ, θ(X)) can take several functional forms (table 1) ; see Wasserman, 2004, p. 193 . The key differences between the three approaches is that:
(a) the frequentist approach relies exclusively on M θ (x), (b) the decision-theoretic framing allows for an action (decision) space that can be different from Θ and adds a loss (or utility) function L(θ, h(x)), for all θ∈Θ and x∈R n X , and (c) the Bayesian approach adds a prior distribution: π(θ), for all θ∈Θ. 
The apparent accommodation of both the frequentist and Bayesian approaches stems from the fact that the loss function depends on both the sample and parameter spaces via the two quantifiers 'for all θ∈Θ and all x∈R n X '. The quantifier 'for all x∈R n X ' is deemed to create an affinity with the frequentist approach. The universal quantifier 'for all θ ∈Θ' creates a similar affinity with the Bayesian approach because it is a key component of the posterior distribution:
, for all θ∈Θ, on the basis of which Bayesian inferences are framed. Indeed, the affinity between the decision-theoretic and Bayesian perspectives does not end there. When Bayesians claim that all the relevant information for any inference concerning θ is given by π(θ|x 0 ) they only admit to half the truth. The other half is that for selecting a Bayesian 'optimal' estimator of θ one needs to invoke additional information like a loss (or utility) function L( θ(X), θ). An appropriate Bayes estimator is usually selected by minimizing the posterior risk:
The loss function plays a crucial role is selecting an optimal estimator because:
2 the Bayes estimator θ is the mean of π(θ|x 0 ),
(ii) when L 1 ( θ, θ)=| θ − θ| the Bayes estimator θ is the median of π(θ|x 0 ),
, where δ(.)= 0 for θ=θ 1 for θ =θ , the Bayes estimator θ is the mode of π(θ|x 0 ); note that for purely mathematical reasons δ(.) is often written:
δ(θ, θ)= 0 for θ−θ < ε 1 for θ−θ ≥ ε , for some small ε > 0; see Schervish (1995) .
To render the notion of a loss function operational one needs to deal with the two quantifiers 'for all θ∈Θ' and 'for all x∈R n X '. To eliminate the latter quantifier the decision-theoretic approach takes expectations with respect to f (x; θ) for all x∈R n X to reduce it to a single number, the mean of the loss function L(θ, θ), known as the risk function:
which is now only a function of θ∈Θ. In practice, the most widely used loss function is the square, whose risk function is known as the Mean Square Error (MSE):
From a decision-theoretic perspective a minimal property for an estimator is considered to be admissibility. An estimator θ(X) is inadmissible if there exists another estimator θ(X) such that:
and the strict inequality (<) holds for at least one value of θ. Otherwise, θ(X) is said to be admissible with respect to the loss function L(θ, θ).
Having eliminated the quantifier 'for all x∈R n X ', one needs to deal with the quantifier 'for all θ∈Θ'. This is because risk functions often intersect, rendering one estimator better than another for certain values of Θ 1 ⊂Θ, but worse for other values θ∈Θ−Θ 1 . The two most widely used such reductions are:
where π(θ) denotes the prior distribution of θ.
Having reduced the risk function from 'all θ∈Θ' down to a scalar, the obvious way to choose among different estimators is to find the ones that minimize this scalar with respect to all possible estimators: θ(.): R n X → Θ. Such a minimization gives rise to the two widely used decision rules:
where the infimum is over all possible estimators θ(X).
Taking admissibility as the criterion for choosing among estimators, the main result concerns a Bayes rule θ B (X) based on a prior π(θ). The result is that under the following regularity conditions:
[i] R(θ, θ) is a continuous function of θ for every estimator θ(X),
[iii] π(θ) has full support in the sense that θ+ε θ−ε π(θ)dθ > 0 for all θ∈Θ and ε > 0, the Bayes rule θ B (X), based on a prior π(θ), is admissible.
The main result relating the two types of optimal estimators (decision rules) is that for a Bayes rule θ B (X), corresponding to some prior π(θ) is minimax if:
[a] R(θ, θ B ) = c < ∞, i.e. its risk function is constant, and
Taken together the above results have led to the following widely accepted standpoint in statistics.
Decision-theoretic/Bayesian claim. The decision-theoretic framing strongly suggests that the way to generate good (optimal) statistical procedures is to find the Bayes solution using a reasonable prior and then examine its frequentist properties to see whether it is satisfactory from the latter viewpoint.
The quintessential example that has bolstered the appeal of the above claim is the James-Stein estimator (Efron and Morris, 1973) , that gave rise to a sizeable literature on shrinkage estimators; see Saleh (2006) .
Stein's paradox
Consider the case of an independent sample X:=(X 1 , X 2 , ..., X m ) from a Normal distribution:
where σ 2 is known. Using the notation θ:=(θ 1 , θ 2 , ..., θ m ) and I m :=diag(1, 1, ..., 1), this can be denoted by:
The primary aim is to find a good estimator θ(X) of θ where its 'optimality' is assessed in terms of the square (Euclidean) loss function:
Stein (1955) astounded the statistical world by showing that for m=2 the LeastSquares estimator θ LS (X)= X is admissible, but for m > 2 is inadmissible. Indeed, James and Stein (1961) were able to come up with a nonlinear estimator:
referred to as the James-Stein estimator that dominates θ LS (X)= X in terms of the MSE criterion:
by demonstrating that:
It turns out that θ JM (X) is also inadmissible and dominated by the modified James-Stein estimator that is admissible:
where (z) + = max(0, z); see Wasserman (2004) . The traditional interpretation of this result is that when the mean θ:=(θ 1 , θ 2 , ..., θ m ), for m > 2, from a Normal, Independent sample X are the unknown parameters of interest, the James-Stein estimator reduces their overall MSE by using a combined nonlinear estimator as opposed to the linear Least-Squares estimator, which is inadmissible. In contrast, when each parameter is estimated separately, the least squares (LS) estimator is admissible. This result seem to imply that one will 'do better' (in expected loss terms) by using a combined nonlinear (shrinkage) estimator, instead of estimating these means separately. What is surprising about this result is that there is no statistical reason to connect the inferences pertaining to the different individual means, and yet the obvious estimator (LS) is inadmissible. As argued below, contrary to the conventional wisdom this calls into question the appropriateness of the notions of a loss function and admissibility, and not the judiciousness of frequentist estimation.
Risk functions and acceptance sampling
Despite the apparent affinity between the decision-theoretic set up and the Neyman-Pearson (N-P) 'accept/reject' rules, a closer look reveals that it is actually at odds with the primary objective and the inductive reasoning underlying frequentist inference in general and N-P testing in particular.
Where do loss functions come from?
A closer scrutiny of the decision-theoretic set up reveals that the loss function needs to invoke 'information from sources other than the data', which is usually not readily available. Indeed, such information is available in very restrictive situations, such as acceptance sampling in quality control. In light of that, a proper understanding of the intended scope of statistical inference calls for distinguishing the special cases where the loss function is part and parcel of the available substantive information from those that no such information is either relevant or available.
As Fisher (1935) warned several decades ago:
"In the field of pure research no assessment of the cost of wrong conclusions, or of delay in arriving at more correct conclusions can conceivably be more than a pretence, and in any case such an assessment would be inadmissible and irrelevant in judging the state of the scientific evidence." (pp. [25] [26] More recently, Tiao and Box (1975) , p. 624, reiterated Fisher's distinction:
"Now it is undoubtly true that on the one hand that situations exist where the loss function is at least approximately known (for example certain problems in business) and sampling inspection are of this sort. ... On the other hand, a vast number of inferential problems occur, particularly in the analysis of scientific data, where there is no way of knowing in advance to what use the results of research will subsequently be put."
Cox (1978), p. 45, went further and questioned this framing even in cases where the inference might involve a decision:
"The reasons that the detailed techniques [of the decision-theoretic approach] seem of fairly limited applicability, even when a fairly clearcut decision element is involved, may be (i) that, except in such fields as control theory and acceptance sampling, a major contribution of statistical technique is in presenting the evidence in incisive form for discussion, rather than in providing mechanical presentation for the final decision. This is especially the case when a single major decision is involved.
(ii) The central difficulty may be in formulating the elements required for the quantitative analysis, rather than in combining these elements via a decision rule."
Even current textbooks framed around the decision-theoretic set up admit the difficulty of specifying a loss function:
"The actual determination of the loss function is often awkward in practice, in particular because the determination of the consequences of each action for each value of θ is usually impossible when D or Θ are large sets, for instance when they have an infinite number of elements." (p. 52) Indeed, the determination of the loss function is always awkward since both sets D and Θ are usually infinite. Moreover, when one focuses on the analysis of scientific data, the use of loss functions can give rise to misleading impressions of affinity, similarity and analogy. For instance, it is widely accepted that the expected loss (risk) represents a genuine frequentist error analogous to the type I and II error probabilities: In what follows it is argued that such claims are misinformed. It is not obvious why a loss function like the MSE( θ(X); θ), evaluates 'errors' associated with the inherent capacity of an estimator θ(X) to pin-point the true θ. The discussion demonstrates that the decision-theoretic framing has a lot more affinity with the Bayesian perspective than it seems at first sight, and some of Fisher's qualms are well-grounded.
'Nuts and bolts' vs. learning from data
Let us bring out the key features of a situation where the above decisiontheoretic set up makes perfectly good sense. This is the situation Fisher (1955) called acceptance sampling, such as an industrial production process where the objective is quality control, i.e. to make a decision pertaining to shipping sub-standard products (e.g. nuts and bolts) to a buyer using the expected loss/gain as the ultimate criterion. In such a context the MSE( θ(X); θ), or some other risk function, are relevant because they evaluate genuine losses associated with a decision related to the choice of an estimate θ(x 0 ), say the cost of the observed percentage of defective products, but that has nothing to do with type I and II error probabilities.
Acceptance sampling differs from the usual scientific context in two crucial respects:
[a] The primary aim is to use statistical rules to guide actions astutely, e.g. use θ(x 0 ) in order to minimize the expected loss associated with "a decision", and
[b] The sagacity of all actions is determined by the respective 'losses' stemming from "relevant information other than the data" (Cox and Hinkley, 1974, p. 251).
The key difference between acceptance sampling and a scientific inquiry is that the primary objective of the latter is not to minimize expected loss (costs, utility) associated with different values of θ∈Θ, but to use data x 0 to learn about the 'true' model:
where θ * denotes true value of θ in Θ, whatever that happens to be. The two situations are drastically different mainly because the key notion of a 'true θ' calls into question the above acceptance sampling set up. Indeed, the loss function being defined for all θ∈Θ, will usually penalize θ * , and there is no reason to believe that the θ ranked lowest when minimizing the expected loss would coincide with θ * , unless by accident. Consider the case where acceptance sampling resembles hypothesis testing in so far as final products are randomly selected for inspection during the production process. In such a situation the main objective can be viewed as operationalizing the probabilities of false acceptance/rejection with a view to minimize the expected losses. The conventional wisdom has been that this situation is similar enough to Neyman-Pearson (N-P) testing to render the latter as the appropriate framing for the decision to ship this particular batch or not. However, a closer look at some of the examples used to illustrate such a situation (Silvey, 1975) , reveals that the decisions are driven exclusively by the risk function and not by any aspiration to learn from data about the true θ * . For instance, N-P way of addressing the trade-off between the two types of error probabilities, fixing α to a small value and seek a test that minimizes the type II error probability, seems utterly irrelevant in such a context. One can easily think of a loss function where the 'optimal' trade-off calls for a much larger type I than type II error probability. That is, in acceptance sampling:
[c] The trade-off between the two types of error probabilities is determined by the risk function itself, and not by any attempt to learn from data about θ * . In light of the crucial differences [a]-[c], one can make a strong case that the objectives and the underlying reasoning of acceptance sampling are drastically different from those pertaining to a scientific context.
Loss function vs. inherent distance function
The notion of a loss function stemming from 'information other than the data' raises another source of potential conflict. This emanates from the fact that within each statistical model M θ (x) in (1) there exists an inherent statistical distance function, often relating to the score function, and thus on information contained in the data; see Casella and Berger (2002) .
It is well-known that when the distribution underlying M θ (x) is Normal, the inherent distance function for comparing estimators of the mean θ is the square:
evaluated at θ=θ * , the 'true' θ in Θ. On the other hand, when the distribution is Laplace (see Shao, 2003 ) the relevant statistical distance function is the Absolute Distance:
Similarly, when the distribution underlying M θ (x) is Uniform, the inherent distance function is:
A key feature of all these distance functions is that they are defined in terms of θ * , the true θ, whatever that value happens to be. In contrast, the traditional loss functions are defined for all possible values of θ∈Θ.
The question that naturally arises is when it might make sense to ignore these inherent distance functions and compare estimators using an externally given loss function stemming from information other than the data.
Frequentist inference and learning from data
An important dimension of frequentist inference that has not been adequately appreciated in the statistics literature concerns its objectives and underlying reasoning. As mentioned above, its primary objective is to learn from data about the true model M * (x)={f (x; θ * )}, x∈R n X . The underlying reasoning comes in two alternative forms. For estimation and prediction, the reasoning is factual, but for hypothesis testing it is hypothetical. Let us elaborate on these issues.
Frequentist estimation
The nature of frequentist reasoning underlying estimation is factual, in the sense the optimality of an estimator (its generic capacity to zero in on θ * ) is appraised in terms of its sampling distribution evaluated under the True State of Nature (TSN), i.e. TSN: θ=θ * , whatever θ * ∈Θ happens to be.
The primary objective of frequentist inference, in general, is to learn from data x 0 about the 'true' statistical data generating mechanism (7). Point estimators contribute to this objective by effectively pin-pointing θ * for all sample realizations. Indeed, optimal properties like consistency, unbiasedness, full efficiency, sufficiency, etc. evaluate the generic capacity of θ n (X) to zero in on θ * . Its effectiveness for different sample realizations x∈R n X is measured by its sampling distribution:
f ( θ n (x); θ * ), for x∈R n X . A key feature of frequentist inference is that the sampling distribution of any statistic Y n =g(X) (estimator, test, predictor) is derived via:
Hence, the sampling distribution f ( θ n (x); θ * ) of an estimator θ n (X) is derived by integrating f (x; θ * ), i.e. evaluated under θ=θ * . In contrast, in hypothesis testing the sampling distribution of a test statistic d(X) is derived via (8) by integrating f (x; θ) where θ is given different hypothetical values under both the null and alternative hypotheses.
For instance, strong consistency asserts that θ n (X) will zero-in on θ * with probability one as n → ∞ :
That is, for a 'large enough' n, θ n (X) will pin-point θ * almost surely. Similarly, unbiasedness asserts that the sampling distribution of θ n (X) has a mean equal to θ * : E( θ n (X))=θ * .
In this sense both of these optimal properties are defined at the point θ=θ * , and not 'for all θ∈Θ'. Indeed, defining unbiasedness as: E( θ n (X))=θ for all θ∈Θ, makes no sense in frequentist estimation. What is of interest for a frequentist is whether the sampling distribution of θ n (X) has a mean equal to the true θ * or not. Similarly, the appropriate frequentist definition of the MSE for an estimator is defined at the point θ=θ * :
This is, the only point at which the concept of bias makes sense is:
rendering the decomposition of the MSE defined at θ=θ * :
a meaningful measure of the dispersion of the sampling distribution of θ n (X) around θ=θ * . This is because the variance is defined as the variation around at the true mean θ * , whatever value that happens to be! This viewpoint goes back to Fisher (1920) in his discussion of two different estimators of σ= V ar(X) that led him to the property of sufficiency. In contrast, the notion of dispersion around all possible value of θ in Θ, like (3), is meaningless for an estimator aiming to pin-point θ * . The above reasoning has nothing to do with the quantifier 'for all possible values of θ∈Θ', despite claims made by numerous textbook writers:
"The frequentist paradigm relies on this criterion [risk function] to compare estimators and, if possible, to select the best estimator, the reasoning being that estimators are evaluated on their long-run performance for all possible values of the parameter θ." (Robert, 2007, p. 61) In terms of elementary logic, the confusion can be explained as the result of conflating two different quantifiers:
(a) the universal 'for all θ∈Θ', denoted by ∀θ∈Θ, and (b) the existential quantifier, 'there exists a θ * ∈Θ such that', denoted by ∃θ * ∈Θ. This is exemplified by the two different definitions of the MSE:
Hence, the apparent affinity between a square loss function and the dispersion of an estimator is illusory because the only relevant dispersion from the frequentist perspective is around the true value θ * . What is perhaps most surprising is that statistics textbooks adopt one or the other definition of unbiasedness and the MSE in (12) and ignore (or seem unaware) of the other. What is less surprisingly is that Bayesian textbook writers, like Robert (2007) , Berger (1985) and Ghosh et al. (2006) , invariably adopt the definition with the quantifier 'for all θ∈Θ'.
A closer look at the decision-theoretic setup reveals that it would penalize the value θ=θ * . The only loss function that could potentially avoid that problem is the zero-one function:
However, (13) is non-operational in practice because θ * is the unknown of interest! To add insult to injury, this is often used as the justification for using the quantifier 'for all θ∈Θ'; see Robert (2007) . This is clearly totally misinformed about frequentist inference procedures whose relevant error probabilities are ascertainable without any need to know θ * , because they are not attached to different values of θ, but to the inference procedures themselves.
Admissibility as a 'minimal' property
The factual nature of frequentist reasoning in estimation also brings out the impertinence of the notion of admissibility stemming from its reliance on the quantifier 'for all θ∈Θ'. To see that more clearly let us consider the following example.
Example. In the context of the simple Normal model in (14) , let us consider a MSE comparison between two estimators of θ:
(ii) the 'crystalball' estimator: θ cb (x)=7405926, for all x∈R n X . It turns out that both estimators are admissible and thus equally acceptable on admissibility grounds. This surprising result stems primarily from the quantifier 'for all θ∈Θ'. Indeed, for certain values of θ close to θ cb , say θ∈(θ cb ± λ √ n ), for 0 < λ < 1, the latter is 'better' than X n since:
Common sense suggests that if a criterion cannot distinguish between X n [a strongly consistent, unbiased, fully efficient and sufficient estimator] and an arbitrarily chosen real number that ignores the data altogether, it is practically useless for distinguishing between 'good' and 'bad' estimators in frequentist statistics. Moreover, it is obvious that the source of the problem is the quantifier ∀θ∈Θ. In contrast to admissibility, the property of consistency instantly eliminates the crystal ball estimator θ cb . In light of the fact that the optimal properties of an estimator concern its generic capacity to zero-in on θ * , the relevant frequentist errors need to be associated with a particular inference procedure. The factual nature of the underlying frequentist estimation reasoning precludes any error probabilities associated with the direct inference θ(x 0 )=θ * as illegitimate, because post-data θ(x 0 ) is either equal to θ * or not, and no non-degenerate probability can be attached to either of those two alternatives.
James-Stein estimator: a frequentist perspective
For a proper evaluation of the above James-Stein result, it is important to bring out the conflict between the overall MSE and the reasoning underlying frequentist estimation. When the James-Stein estimator is viewed from this frequentist perspective several issues arise.
First, the James-Stein result (6) is practically useless because θ LS (X) and θ JS (X) are inconsistent estimators of θ since there is essentially one observation (X k ) for each unknown parameter (θ k ), and as m → ∞ the number of unknown parameters increases at the same rate. To bring out the futility of comparing these two estimators more markedly, consider the following simpler example.
Example. Let X:=(X 1 , X 2 , ..., X n ) be a sample from the simple Normal model:
Comparing the two estimators θ 1 =X n , θ 2 = 1 2 (X 1 + X n ) and inferring that θ 2 is relatively more efficient than θ 1 since:
, for all θ∈R, is totally uninteresting because both estimators are practically useless. This is because in frequentist estimation the minimal property for estimators is not admissibility but consistency, on the basis of which both of these estimators will be excluded from consideration. Indeed, no frequentist would seriously propose θ 1 or θ 2 as sensible estimators.
In light of that, a way to render the above Stein paradox potentially interesting from the frequentist perspective is to use panel (longitudinal) data where the sample takes the form:
In this case the Least-Squares and James-Stein estimators take the form:
Second, the notion of "better" in the James-Stein result needs to be evaluated more critically. It is clear that the James-Stein loss function in (5) introduces a trade-off between the accuracy of the estimators of individual parameters (θ 1 , θ 2 , ..., θ m ) and the overall accuracy in the sense that the increase in the latter is at the expense of former. Hence, the James-Stein result raises a key question: 'in what sense the overall MSE among a group of estimated means based on statistically independent processes provides a better measure of 'error' in learning about the true means?' The short answer is that it doesn't. Indeed, the overall MSE will not be the relevant statistical error when the primary objective of estimation is to learn from data about θ * , the true value of θ; the one that generated the data in question. Having said that, such an expected loss might be relevant for substantive purposes when the underlying components of the vector stochastic process {X t , t∈N=(1, 2, ...)} are related in a substantive sense via some extraneous loss function. For learning purposes, however, the two objectives should be kept separate because they are promoting very different objectives.
Third, the key concept underlying the James-Stein result, that of admissibility with respect to a particular loss function, seems inappropriate for frequentist inference in general and optimal estimation in particular. The conflict arises because the primary aim and nature of reasoning underlying frequentist inference in general is at odds with the quantifier 'for all θ∈Θ' underlying these concepts. There is nothing in the notion of admissibility that promotes learning from data about θ * , or calibrating the procedure's capacity to achieve that aim. On the contrary, it treats all possible values of θ in Θ on par.
Fourth, the evaluation of the overall MSE that depend on extraneous information can be both awkward as well as highly misleading in practice. To bring out the difficulties, let us take an example from economics, a field where loss functions supposedly arise naturally. Consider the simple linear regression model:
where the unknown parameters of interest are θ:=(β, σ 2 ), β:=(β 0 , β 1 , β 2 , β 3 ). A moment's reflection suggests that serious practical difficulties are raised by the mathematical structure of a loss function such as that of Stein:
where Z:=(y, X), and the James-Stein estimator takes the form:
The crucial source of the problem is that in a decision-theoretic context L 2 (β, β(Z)) is treated as a unitless numerical measure of how costly are the various consequences of potential decisions associated with β(z 0 ). However, it is well-known that the regression coefficients are not unitless; β i depends crucially on the units of measurement of both y t and x it , i=1, 2, 3. Worse, in practice such coefficients vary greatly in magnitude, say β 1 (z 0 )=1.8, and β 3 (z 0 )= −.004, rendering the smaller coefficient estimates more or less irrelevant for cost purposes because their relative contribution in (15) will be miniscule. Moreover, one can change the cost associated with any coefficient by changing the units of measurement of any of the variables involved, which in the case of economics it will be trivial to do. Such changes in the units of measurement will change drastically the ranking of different potential decisions. In summary, the above example raises serious practical questions about how the loss function machinery can be implemented in practice to render the expected loss associated with β(z 0 ) for different values of β meaningful. In particular, two practical questions arise:
(i) where does the extraneous information concerning costs associated with parameter values come from? and (ii) how does one select the functional form of the loss function to avoid the serious unit of measurement problems raised above?
Confidence Interval Estimation
To bring out the frequentist reasoning underlying Confidence Interval (CI) estimation, let us return to the simple Normal model in (14) and have a closer look at the sampling distribution of a good estimator, X n , [consistent, unbiased, fully efficient, sufficient] often stated as:
What is not usually explicitly revealed is that the evaluation of that distribution is factual, i.e. under the True State of Nature (TSN), θ=θ * , and denoted by:
What is remarkable about this result is that when X n is standardized to define the pivotal function:
one is certain that (17) holds only for the true θ * and no other value. For any other value of θ, say θ 1 =θ * , the same evaluation will yield:
The factual reasoning result in (17) provides the basis for constructing the (1−α) Confidence Interval (CI):
which asserts that the random interval
, will cover (overlay) the true mean θ * , whatever that happens to be, with probability (1−α), or equivalently, the error of coverage is α. Hence, frequentist estimation the coverage error probability depends only on the sampling distribution of X n and is attached to random interval for all values θ =θ * without requiring one to know θ * .
The factual reasoning underlying estimation renders the post-data coverage error probability degenerate since the TSN has played out and the observed CI
either includes or excludes θ * , but there is no way to know. That is, there is no non-degenerate post-data error probability one can attach to different values of θ within the observed interval. The same factual reasoning undermines any attempt to use θ(x 0 )=θ * as a legitimate inference result.
Any attempt by Bayesians (see Robert, 2007) to present various erroneous interpretations of frequentist error probabilities by practitioners as evidence that favors the Bayesian reasoning as being more intuitive is totally misplaced. A more convincing explanation is that such misinterpretations linger on in the statistical literature since the pre-Fisher era, where the 'probable error' interval was given in terms of an inverse-probability (Bayesian) interpretation; see Bowley (1937) , Mills (1938) .
Frequentist Hypothesis testing
Another frequentist inference procedure one can employ to learn from data about θ * is hypothesis testing where the question posed is whether θ * is close enough to some prespecified value θ 0 .
In contrast to estimation, the reasoning underlying frequentist testing is hypothetical in nature. For testing the hypotheses:
H 0 : θ = θ 0 vs. H 1 : θ > θ 0 , where θ 0 is a prespecified value, one returns to the same sampling distribution in (16) , but transforms the pivotal quantity in (17) into the test statistic by replacing θ * with the prespecified value θ 0 , yielding d(X):= √ n X n − θ 0 . However, instead of evaluating it under the TSN, it is now evaluated under various hypothetical scenarios associated with H 0 and H 1 to yield two types of (hypothetical) sampling distributions:
In both cases (I)-(II) the underlying reasoning is hypothetical in the sense that the TSN in (17) is replaced by hypothesized values of θ, and the test statistic provides a distance between the hypothesized values and θ * the true θ, assumed to underlie the generation of the data x 0 , yielding d(x 0 ). Using the sampling distribution in (I) one can define the following legitimate error probabilities:
Using the sampling distribution in (II) one can define: type II error prob.:
It can be shown that the test T α , defined by the test statistic d(X) and the rejection region C 1 (α)={x :d(x) > c α }, constitutes a Uniformly Most Powerful (UMP) test for significance level α; see Lehmann (1959) . The type I [II] error probability is associated with test T α erroneously rejecting [accepting] H 0 . The type I and II error probabilities evaluate the generic capacity [whatever the sample realization x∈R n ] of a test to reach correct inferences. Contrary to Bayesian claims, these error probabilities have nothing to do with the temporal or the physical dimension of the long-run metaphor associated with repeated samples. The relevant feature of the long-run metaphor is the repeatability (in principle) of the DGM represented by M θ (x). A feature that can be easily operationalized using computer simulation; see Spanos (2012c) .
The key difference between the significance level α and the p-value is that the former is a pre-data and the latter a post-data error probability. Indeed, the p-value can be viewed as the smallest significance level α at which H 0 would have been rejected with data x 0 . The legitimacy of post-data error probabilities underlying the hypothetical reasoning can be used to go beyond the N-P accept/reject rules and provide an evidential interpretation pertaining to the discrepancy from the null warranted by data x 0 . This is achieved using the post-data severity evaluation reasoning which can be used to address the fallacies of acceptance and rejection, as well as shed light on several confusions in frequentist inference; see Mayo (1996) , Mayo and Spanos (2006; 2011) . In relation to this it is important to note that the overwhelming majority of these confusions have been introduced into frequentist inference by Bayesians by deploying rigged examples; see Spanos (2010; 2011a-b; 2012a-d) .
Despite the fact that frequentist testing uses hypothetical reasoning, its main objective is also to learn from data about the true model
There is a modicum of truth in the usual textbook claim that a test statistic provides a measure of disagreement (discordance) between the data x 0 and the hypothesized θ 0 , even though the claim is somewhat misleading because it compares apples and oranges; θ 0 lives in Θ and x 0 in R n X , respectively. A more appropriate way to frame this claim, however, is that a test statistic like d(X):= √ n X n −θ 0 constitutes nothing more than a scaled distance between θ * [the value behind the generation of X n ], and a hypothesized value θ 0 . This stems from the fact that frequentist inference assumes that the data x 0 have been generated by M * (x).
6 Is expected loss a legitimate frequentist error?
The question that naturally arises at this stage is 'what do the above frequentist error probabilities, the type I and II, the p-value and the coverage error probability, have in common?' First, they all stem directly from the statistical model M θ (x) since the underlying sampling distributions of estimators, test statistics and predictors are derived exclusively from the distribution of the sample f (x; θ) via (8) . In this sense, the relevant error probabilities are directly related to statistical information pertaining to the data as summarized by the statistical model M θ (x) itself. In this sense, they have nothing to do with ad hoc loss [cost, utility] functions based on extraneous information 'other than the data'.
Second, all these error probabilities are attached to a particular frequentist inference procedure as they related to a relevant inferential claim. These error probabilities calibrate the effectiveness of inference procedures in learning from data about the true statistical model M * (x)={f (x; θ * )}, x∈R n X . It is important to emphasize that 'truth' in this context refers to statistical, and not substantive, adequacy, i.e. M * (x) could have generated the data x 0 in question in so far as x 0 represents a 'truly typical realization' of the stochastic process {X t , t∈N} underlying M θ (x), with the 'typicality' being testable vis-a-vis the data x 0 .
In light of these features, the question is: 'how do the risk comparisons of the decision-theoretic perspective relate to these frequentist error probabilities?' or 'in what sense a risk function defined by (2) could potentially represent relevant frequentist errors?' According to some Bayesians (see Robert, 2007) , the risk function does represent a legitimate frequentist error because it is derived by taking expectations with respect to f (x; θ), x∈R n X . This argument is misleading for several reasons.
(a) The expected losses stemming from the risk function R(θ, θ) are attached to particular values of θ in Θ, including θ * . This assignment is in direct conflict with all the above legitimate error probabilities that are attached to the inference procedure itself, and never to the particular values of θ in Θ. The expected loss assigned to each value of θ in Θ has nothing to do with learning from data about θ * . Indeed, the risk function will penalize a procedure for pinpointing θ * ! Granted, the 'crystal ball' estimate θ(x 0 )=θ ‡ , for a prespecified value θ ‡ in Θ, can be a legitimate decision-theoretic rule as well as a legitimate Bayesian inference with its associated degree of belief, but it is never a legitimate frequentist inference. In this sense expected losses can be useful in other contexts such as 'acceptance sampling', where the objective of the inference is driven by the risk function.
(b) The second difficulty with the above claim is that a quantity cannot be rendered meaningful or relevant for frequentist inference just because it is defined by taking expectations over all x∈R n X . Indeed, in a decision-theoretic framework, the dependence of the loss function on x∈R n X is treated a nuisance that is addressed by taking expectations with respect to f (x; θ), so that the risk function involves only θ∈Θ. This is very different from expectations with respect to the sampling distribution of an estimator θ n (X), i.e. E( θ n (X))=θ * , since the latter pertains to the true value θ * . Indeed, comparing the expected loss to the above legitimate error probabilities it becomes clear that any loss function-based evaluations that depend on extraneous information can be both awkward as well as highly misleading in practice.
In light of the above discussion, it is not a coincidence that textbooks written by Bayesian statisticians extol the virtues of the decision-theoretic perspective and then proceed to present the Bayesian approach as its natural extension; see Berger (1985) , Bernardo and Smith (2000) , Ghosh et al (2006) , Robert (2007) , Schervish (1995) inter alia. What makes the Bayesian case against frequentist inference misplaced is its conflating of the universal (for all θ∈Θ) with the existential (there exists a θ * ∈Θ such that) quantifiers, and then charging the frequentists with fallacious results stemming from the very confusion permeating the Bayesian claims.
Summary and conclusions
The above discussion called into question the claim that decision theory provides a unifying framework for comparing the frequentist and Bayesian approaches to inference by using a common terminology based on decision rules, action spaces, loss and risk functions, admissibility, etc. It is argued that a closer look reveals that the decision-theoretic perspective distorts frequentist inference for two main reasons.
First, the quantifier 'for all θ∈Θ' is inappropriate for evaluating frequentist inference procedures because their primary objective is to learn from data about the true value θ * ! What matters for a good frequentist procedure is not its behavior for all possible values θ∈Θ, but how well it does in shedding light on the true value θ * ∈Θ. This capacity to learn from data is what legitimate frequentist error probabilities are calibrating. They do that by assigning error probabilities to the inference procedures themselves, and not to different values of θ in Θ.
Second, in light of the inappropriateness of the universal quantifier, the risk function R(θ, θ) does not give rise to any relevant errors pertaining to frequentist inference because its attribution of expected losses to different values of θ in Θ has nothing to do with learning from data about θ=θ * . Instead, it is relevant for evaluating expected losses in situations like acceptance sampling where the loss function is based on (cost, utility) information other than the data. Fisher (1955) was correct in claiming that the latter scenario is atypical of statistical modeling in a scientific context, and the decision-theoretic perspective distorts frequentist inference because the objectives of inference in the two cases are at odds with each other.
The combination of the inappropriateness of admissibility and the irrelevance of extraneous (other than the data) loss information when the primary objective is learning about the true state of nature (θ=θ * ), calls into question: (i) the appropriateness of the decision-theoretic set up for comparing the frequentist and Bayesian approaches,
(ii) the relevance and appropriateness of the James-Stein risk 'optimality', and (iii) the standpoint that a way to generate good statistical procedures is to find the Bayes solution for a particular risk function using a reasonable prior and then examine its frequentist properties to see whether it is satisfactory from the latter viewpoint.
